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UNIVERSITY SOFTWARE OWNERSHIP AND
LITIGATION: A FIRST EXAMINATION*
ARTI K. RAI, JOHN R. ALLISON, AND BHAVEN N. SAMPAT**
Software patents and university-owned patents represent two of
the most controversial intellectual property developments of the
last twenty-five years. Despite this reality, and concerns that
universities act as "patent trolls" when they assert software
patents in litigation against successful commercializers, no
scholar has systematically examined the ownership and litigation
of university software patents. In this Article, we present the first
such examination. Our empirical research reveals that software
patents represent a significant and growing proportion of
university patent holdings. Additionally, the most important
determinant of the number of software patents a university owns
is not its research and development ("R&D") expenditures
(whether computer science-related or otherwise) but, rather, its
tendency to seek patents in other areas. In other words,
universities appear to take a "one size fits all" approach to
patenting their inventions. This one size fits all approach is
problematic given the empirical evidence that software is likely to
follow a different commercialization path than other types of
invention. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that we see a
number of lawsuits in which university software patents have
been used not for purposes of fostering commercialization, but
instead to extract rents in apparent holdup litigation. The Article
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concludes by examining whether this trend is likely to continue in
the future, particularly given a 2006 Supreme Court decision that
appears to diminish the holdup threat by recognizing the
possibility of liability rules in patent suits, as well as recent case
law that may call into question certain types of software patents.
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INTRODUCTION
Software patents and university-owned patents represent two of
the most controversial intellectual property developments of the past
few decades. Various scholars have quarreled with the alleged
vagueness and undue breadth of software patent claims.! Some have
1. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK 187-214 (2008); Dan
Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1623 (2003)
(arguing that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears all appeals in
patent cases, has an exaggerated sense of the skill of the ordinary computer scientist and is
therefore likely to allow broad patents); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy, A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1053-54
(2003) (arguing that because pure software patents are not limited to a particular physical
machine or process, they may be problematic in terms of breadth). But see Robert P.
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also suggested that, given the poor quality of prior art documentation
and patent examiner training in the area of software, many issued
software patents are likely to be obvious.2 More generally, there is
significant debate over the extent to which software patents are likely
to foster (or hinder) innovation.3 Because software products are
often "complex" and may infringe many patents, some incumbent
providers of information technology ("IT") products support limiting
patentability.4 Perhaps most notably, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (arguably prompted by the recent questioning of
patents on "abstract ideas" by several members of the Supreme
Court5) recently excluded processes from patentability (including
Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1627, 1649-52 (2007) (arguing that some recent Federal Circuit cases have interpreted
disclosure requirements for software patents more rigorously).
2. See generally Glynn Lunney, E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 363 (2001) (making this argument and further arguing that the Federal Circuit tends
to affirm lower court determinations that a patent is nonobvious while reversing
determinations that a patent is obvious and thus does not meet a prerequisite of
patentability).
3. Compare James Bessen & Robert Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents,
16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 157, 173-74, 180-85 (2007) (arguing that software
patents are substitutes for research and development), with Ronald Mann, Do Patents
Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 999-1003 (2005)
(arguing that software patents may help certain types of small software firms attract
financing). Similarly, a study by Noel and Schankerman that is in tension with the findings
of Bessen and Hunt examines software firms only. See Michael Noel & Mark
Schankerman, Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation 12 (London Sch. of Econ. &
Pol. Sci., Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Paper No. E143, June 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1158320. These papers can be
reconciled to the extent that Mann's argument in favor of patents is largely limited to
small software firms, while Bessen and Hunt focus on software patents held by large firms
both within and outside the software industry. For discussion of another empirical study
on software patents, see infra note 144 and accompanying text.
4. These firms have supported legislative and judicial efforts to make patents easier
to challenge and injunctive relief, particularly by nonmanufacturing entities, more difficult
to secure. See generally eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)
(clarifying that injunctive relief is not necessarily automatic upon a finding of
infringement); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 321 (2007) (proposing a
robust system of post-grant opposition proceedings). In contrast, while products in the
biopharmaceutical industry may require many patented inputs for their creation, the
products themselves are likely to be covered by only a few patents. Thus, one common
strategy for avoiding patent thickets is secret infringement. See John Walsh et al.,
Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021, 1021 (2003).
5. In LabCorp v. Metabolite Lab, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 124 (2006) (denying certiorari),
Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens dissented from the dismissal of certiorari as
improvidently granted, arguing that patents on abstract ideas and scientific principles
should not be allowed and that the patent in question arguably covered a scientific
principle. Id. at 127-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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software processes) that are not limited to a physical transformation
or machine.6
In contrast with software patents, university-owned patents have
existed for more than a few decades. The number of university-held
patents has increased substantially, however, since the 1980 passage
of the Bayh-Dole Act.7 While the legal question was sometimes
murky prior to 1980, Bayh-Dole made it unequivocally clear that
universities can patent federally funded research.8
Assertive university patenting has attracted attention in both
scholarly and popular literature.9 Additionally, because universities,
and sometimes even their exclusive licensees, are nonmanufacturing
patentees, the intense debate over whether such patentees employ
"holdup" strategies deleterious to innovation when they assert
patents against successful commercializers directly implicates
6. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
7. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3017 (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200-210 (2006)). See NAT'L SCI. BD., NAT'L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE & ENGINEERING
INDICATORS 2006, at 50-51 (2006), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/pdf/
volumel.pdf (noting that numbers of patents issued to academic institutions quadrupled
from approximately 800 in 1988 to more than 3,200 in 2003).
8. Although not all university research is federally funded, the federal share
represented sixty-four percent of university research and development ("R&D") in fiscal
year 2004. See RONDA BRITIT, NAT'L SCI. FOUND., ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES: FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 8 (2006), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf06323/pdf/tabl.pdf. In electrical engineering and computer
science ("EE/CS"), the federal percentage of university R&D in fiscal year 2004 was even
higher, seventy-three percent and sixty-eight percent, respectively. Id. In contrast,
industry accounts for only about five percent of university R&D (including EE/CS R&D).
Id. These percentages have been fairly consistent over the last twenty years. Id. For
example, from 1996 to 1998, the years probably most relevant to patents issued in 2002,
the federal funding percentage for EE/CS was seventy percent, sixty-eight percent, and
sixty-seven percent, in each respective year. Id. The overall federal funding percentage
during those years was about sixty percent. Id.
We report these statistics to buttress our supposition that most software-related
research done by universities is federally (or at least publicly) funded and thus subject to
the types of economic analysis usually employed in thinking about publicly funded
research. Unfortunately, although Bayh-Dole requires universities to report federal
funding when they file for patents, many do not. See University of California, The Bayh-
Dole Act: A Guide to the Law and Implementing Regulations, http://www.ucop.edu/
ott/faculty/bayh.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). Thus, we cannot rely on such reports to
determine the funding source of research that led to specific software patents.
9. In a popular account, Jennifer Washburn suggests that universities are being
corrupted by their interest in commercial activities, including patenting. See generally
JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (2005) (discussing universities and their interest in
commercial activities). For a comprehensive analysis of available data on the impact of
Bayh-Dole, see generally DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL
INNOVATION (2004).
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universities.'" That said, almost all analyses of university patenting
have focused on patenting within the life sciences. 1 This focus is
perhaps not surprising, as the major economic argument put forward
in the legislative history of the Bayh-Dole Act-that patents on
publicly funded invention promote commercialization of such
inventionl 2-would appear to apply most clearly to areas of the life
sciences, such as drug development. Conventional wisdom suggests
that, without the quasi-monopoly protection of a patent on the small
molecule chemical, few firms would be interested in taking a
potentially promising drug candidate through the expensive clinical
trial and approval process. 3
In the case of publicly funded software, by contrast, the need for
a patent and exclusive license to promote further development is less
apparent. 4 Although development costs are not uniformly low, they
10. See generally Mark Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 (2008) (providing a nonempirical analysis of whether
universities should be considered patent "trolls"). The most celebrated recent example of
a lucrative holdup strategy was that pursued by a patent holding company, NTP, against
Research in Motion ("RIM"), the maker of the BlackBerry. In that case, RIM settled for
$612.5 million in order to avoid the imminent threat of court-ordered injunctive relief,
even though the validity of several of the asserted patents had been called into question by
the Patent and Trademark Office. See Yuki Noguchi, BlackBerry Patent Dispute is Settled,
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2006, at Al. For discussion of holdup litigation by universities, see
infra Part IV.B.
11. See, e.g., Pierre Azoulay, Ryan Michigan & Bhaven N. Sampat, The Anatomy of
Medical School Patenting, 357 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2049, 2049-56 (2007); Pierre Azoulay,
Waverly Ding & Toby E. Stuart, The Determinants of Faculty Patenting Behavior:
Demographics or Opportunities?, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 599, 599 (2007); Fiona
Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of
Scientific Knowledge: An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis, 63 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 648,648 (2007).
12. Although the text of Bayh-Dole does not suggest a particular licensing model, the
legislative history of the bill that eventually became the Bayh-Dole Act, as well as that of
similar bills that were being discussed at the time, indicates a focus on exclusive licenses.
House Report 96-1307 notes the importance of exclusive licensing for attracting capital
necessary for development. H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3, 5 (1980). Senate Report
96-480 asserts that, because nonexclusive licenses were generally viewed dismissively in
the business community "as no patent protection at all," nonexclusive licensing by the
government had not been successful in producing development. S. REP. No. 96-480, at 28
(1979).
13. The empirical evidence also indicates that patents are more important for
recouping R&D investment in the pharmaceutical industry than in other manufacturing
industries. See Wesley Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent
(or Not) 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, Feb. 2000),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf (discussing the recouping of R&D costs
in the context of the pharmaceutical industry and other manufacturing industries).
14. Even in the life sciences, the availability of patents on improvements, as well as
the presence of absorptive capacity in commercial firms, may diminish the need for
2009] 1523
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are likely to be low relative to those in the biopharmaceutical
industry."5  Indeed, in certain cases of open source software
development, firms derive revenue not from property rights over the
software product itself, but from a strategy that monetizes the value
of support services and complementary hardware. 6  Thus, if
universities are in fact making strong proprietary claims on software,
scholars should be concerned. The social welfare argument for such
claims is more tenuous than in the life sciences.
Despite IT sector complaints about university behavior, 7 as well
as prominent lawsuits involving software patents, 8 the subject of
university software ownership and litigation has not been studied
systematically. Indeed, this Article represents the first systematic
study of which we are aware."9 We rely in part on a unique, hand-
curated database of university software patents. 20  This quantitative
analysis is supplemented by interviews conducted with technology
transfer officers at those universities that own large numbers of
software patents, as well as academic scientists and other officials
prominent in the open source movement.
exclusive licensing on certain inventions, such as research tools. MOWERY ET AL., supra
note 9, at 158 (discussing the manner in which Columbia's DNA co-transformation
technology was developed commercially without the need for exclusive licensing).
15. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003) (giving an estimate of $802
million for new chemical molecules developed entirely in the private sector). This
estimate, which includes an opportunity cost of capital of about $400 million, would
presumably be somewhat lower where some of the relevant work had already been done
in a federally funded institution. See id.
16. See generally Andrea Bonaccorsi & Cristina Rossi, Why Open Source Software
Can Succeed, 32 RES. POL'Y 1243 (2003) (discussing examples ranging from software
publishers like Red Hat to hardware manufactures like IBM).
17. See, e.g., Hearing on "Bayh-Dole-The Next 25 Years" Before the H. Comm. on
Science and Technology, 110th Cong. 46-56 (2007) (statement of Wayne Johnson, Vice-
President, University Relations Worldwide, Hewlett-Packard); Steve Lohr, IBM and
Universities Plan Collaboration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at Cll (noting a statement by
an IBM vice president that "[u]niversities have made life increasingly difficult to do
research ... because of all the contractual issues around intellectual property").
18. See, e.g., Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
19. Ajay Agrawal and Rebecca Henderson touch on a related subject in their
examination of the patenting practices of the MIT EE/CS faculty. Ajay Agrawal &
Rebecca Henderson, Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from
MIT, 48 MGMT. SCI. 44, 44 (2002). Based on their research, they conclude that patenting
is a "minority activity" for most faculty members in the EE/CS department (and the
mechanical engineering department). Id.
20. Our quantitative analysis focuses on patents primarily because there is no
comprehensive data on the extent to which copyright is asserted by universities.
Copyright attaches as soon as the software is created. Because there is no need to register
copyrights, it is difficult to know the total volume of university software protected by
copyright.
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The combination of our quantitative and qualitative inquiry
yields a number of important results. First, software patents
represent a significant and growing percentage of university patent
holdings.21 Second, university software patenting practices tend to
mimic their nonsoftware patenting practices. The data suggests that
those universities that have a higher patent propensity in general are
also more likely to obtain software patents.22  Similarly, our
interviews show that some universities view software as similar to
other, more physical inventions. 23 The difficulty with this view is that
software is likely to follow a different commercialization path than
other inventions. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that we see a fair
number of litigated cases involving software patents, and that almost
all of these appear to represent situations where the university and/or
its exclusive licensee is asserting the patent against an entity that has
successfully commercialized software independent of the patent.24
Notably, in the majority of these cases, the university's argument has
lost on grounds of either patent invalidity or noninfringement
The main rationale for supporting patenting would, therefore,
appear to be the promotion of start-up businesses, presumably on the
theory that start-ups, and market-based activities more generally, are
likely to be more innovative than activities in large, vertically-
integrated incumbent firms.26  However, whether patents are
necessary for start-up promotion is not as clear in the software area as
it is, for example, in the biotechnology industry. Moreover, in
contrast with biotechnology, where copyright is not available,
universities can use software copyright to achieve revenue generation
goals.
27
It may be that university software patenting is a transient
phenomenon. As we discuss below, 2 some technology transfer
officers argue that they no longer view the patenting of software as a
particularly good mechanism for technology transfer.29 In addition,
the 2006 Supreme Court decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C.,3° allowing district courts discretion to award damages even
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
25. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
26. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
27. See discussion infra Part V.B.
28. See infra Part V.C.
29. See infra Part V.C.
30. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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after validity and infringement have been found, coupled with recent
Federal Circuit case law that may call into question certain types of
software patents, could make software patenting and litigation less
attractive to universities in the future.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the history of
software patenting and how it influenced our methodology for
compiling a database of university software patents. Next, Part II
presents our quantitative results; specifically, we identify trends in,
and determinants of, university software patenting. Part III
integrates these quantitative results with results from our interviews.
Part IV then discusses the "holdup" features present in much
university litigation over software patents. More generally, it
provides a policy analysis of why universities' apparent "one size fits
all" approach to patenting is problematic. Finally, Part V discusses
the path forward, with a focus on whether we are likely to see more of
this unitary approach (and concomitant litigation) in the future.
I. SOFTWARE PATENTING: HISTORY AND METHODS OF
IDENTIFYING
To identify university patents, we began by using the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office's ("PTO") Cassis database to identify all
patents issued in 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002 that were assigned
to institutions classified as Research or Doctoral Universities in the
Carnegie Commission of Higher Education's 1972 or 1994 reports.
We chose these particular years because they span a series of shifts in
the legal regime surrounding software produced at universities." Not
only did university patenting increase significantly after the 1980
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act,32 but patent jurisprudence in the area
of software also evolved considerably. Because this evolution is
closely related to the manner in which we define the term "software
patent," we describe it in some detail below.
31. A methodology that sampled one year of filing would have tracked more precisely
the impact of particular software cases on filing behavior. However, because we did not
aim to measure the precise impact of specific cases, sampling by year of issue was
sufficient for purposes of getting a general sense of trends. Sampling by year of issuance
was a more important issue for our regression analyses, which require that we assess
patenting against (inter alia) R&D expenditures. We address this issue below. See infra
note 70 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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A. The History of Software Patents
In the 1970s, the dominant intellectual property regime for
software was copyright, not patent.33 A 1972 Supreme Court case,
Gottschalk v. Benson,34 appeared to reject software (in that case, a
computerized method for converting decimal numbers to binary
numbers) as patentable subject matter on the grounds that patent law
did not encompass abstract scientific or mathematical principles."
Further, several years later, in the 1980 amendments to the Copyright
Act of 1976, Congress expressly endorsed copyright as an appropriate
protection regime for software.36
The intellectual property terrain shifted in the 1980s. In the 1981
decision Diamond v. Diehr,37 the Supreme Court gave its first clear
indication that certain types of software-implemented inventions
were patentable. Diehr narrowed Gottschalk by upholding as
patentable subject matter a rubber-curing process that used software
to calculate cure time. According to the Diehr Court, the physical
transformation of the rubber "into a different state or thing" took the
invention being claimed out of the realm of abstraction.38
Through the 1980s, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
generally followed a test somewhat similar to that enunciated in
Diehr. Under this test, if an invention's claims involved nothing more
than an algorithm, then the invention could not be patented.39
33. See generally Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for
Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989) (analyzing various means of legal
protection for computer technologies, including copyright and patent law, and their scope
of protection). To be sure, some software patents may have been issued in disguised form
in the 1970s. See E-mail from Richard Brandon, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Univ. of Mich.
Office of Tech. Transfer, to Arti K. Rai, Professor of Law, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law (Nov.
21, 2006 17:19 EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). This fact is not
relevant for our purposes.
34. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
35. Although Gottschalk is generally considered a subject matter case, the Court may
also have been concerned with breadth-the patent in question was not restricted to any
particular implementation of the algorithm. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 65-72. In general, as
noted above, pure software patents of the type at issue in Gottschalk may be broader than
patents covering software restricted to a particular physical process or machine. See Rai,
supra note 1, at 1104-05.
36. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3105, 3028 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2006)).
37. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
38. Id. at 175. In fact, the Diehr Court argued that it had long viewed
"[t]ransformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing' [as] the clue to
the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines." Id. at 184
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
39. See Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
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However, if the claims involved a mathematical algorithm that was
"applied to, or limited by, physical elements or process steps," such
claims would constitute patentable subject matter.40 The overall
message to patent attorneys was that software could be patented, but
it had to be claimed as something else. Assuming an approximate
examination pendency of two years during the relevant period,4'
patents issued in our sample years of 1987 and 1992 should reflect
patenting of software as "something else."
Moreover, as the patent option was becoming more attractive,
copyright was becoming much less so. In the early 1990s, a series of
appellate court decisions made it clear that copyright covered
primarily the literal source code of the program.42
Greater changes lay in store. In the 1994 case of In re Alappat,
43
the Federal Circuit effectively eliminated any limitation on patenting
software by concluding that subject matter criteria could be met by
claiming software as a new machine-a "special purpose" computer-
when it was executed.44 Presumably all software could produce such a
special purpose computer and hence be patentable. Again, assuming
a two-year examination pendency, patents issued in 1997 should begin
to incorporate any effects that decisions like Alappat had on filing
incentives. Also, in 1996, the PTO issued software guidelines that
broadly allowed software as patentable subject matter whether the
software was claimed as a machine or a process.45 Two years later,
the Federal Circuit's decision in State Street v. Signature Financial
Group46 similarly rejected any special subject matter test for software,
finding that software (like all inventions) is patentable if it produces a
"useful" result.47 After State Street, there was no need for even the fig
40. Id.
41. The PTO calculates that average pendency was about two years over the period
from 1988 to 2000. See John L. King, Patent Examination Procedures and Patent Quality,
in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 54,63 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen
A. Merrill eds., 2003) (citing data from Annual Reports of the PTO).
42. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 817 (1st Cir. 1995),
affd, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); Computer Ass'n Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir.
1992).
43. 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Alappat decision was anticipated to some
extent by cases like In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that just
because an apparatus is operated as an algorithm does not make it non-statutory).
44. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545.
45. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg.
7,478, 7,478 (Feb. 28, 1996) (outlining how PTO examiners should scrutinize computer-
related inventions).
46. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
47. Id. at 1375 (arguing that the question of whether a claim encompasses patentable
subject matter should focus on "practical utility").
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leaf of a physical machine or process. Thus, patents issued in 2002
should incorporate any impact of the PTO guidelines and the State
Street decision on filing incentives.48
B. Identifying University Software Patents
Given this history, it is perhaps not surprising that identifying
"software" patents is very difficult. Even now, there is no universally
accepted definition of what a software patent is. To our knowledge,
there have been only a few significant efforts to identify a large data
set of software patents.49 An initial paper by Stuart Graham and
David Mowery," which does not attempt to define the term "software
patent," relies upon certain International Patent Classifications
("IPCs")51 as limited to patents in those classes owned by large
software firms.52 A more recent paper by Graham and Mowery uses
particular U.S. patent classes, once again limited to patents in those
classes which are owned by large software firms.53 The Graham and
Mowery approach is not likely to be significantly overinclusive so
long as it is limited to patents owned by packaged software firms.
However, their approach may be quite underinclusive, missing
48. As noted earlier, the pendulum has arguably begun to swing back. The recent
Federal Circuit decision in In re Bilski states that patent claims to a process must be tied to
a physical transformation or machine. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. This very
recent decision is not, however, directly relevant to our empirical analysis. We discuss the
implications of Bilski for enforcement of university software patents infra Part V.A.
49. We exclude from our discussion a paper by lain Cockburn and Meghan
MacGarvie that focuses on patents held by firms in twenty-seven specific software
markets. See lain M. Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie, Entry, Exit and Patenting in the
Software Industry 12 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12563, Oct.
2006), available at http://www.nber.orglpapers/w12563 (finding that firms are less likely to
enter software markets in which there are more software patents but that, all else equal,
firms that have software patents are more likely to enter these markets).
50. Stuart J.H. Graham & David C. Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection in the
U.S. Software Industry, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 219, 231
(Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
51. Graham and Mowery use IPC classes G06F (subclasses 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, and
15), G06K (subclasses 9 and 15), and H04L (subclass 9). Id.
52. See id. at 232 n.37 (noting that analysis focuses on patents assigned to large,
publicly traded software firms).
53. Stuart J.H. Graham & David C. Mowery, Software Patents: Good News or Bad
News?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE
AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 45, 56-57 (Robert Hahn ed., 2005). The U.S. patent classes are
345, 358, 382, 704, 707, 709, 710, 711, 713, 714, 715, and 717. Similarly, Bronwyn Hall and
Meghan MacGarvie rely on PTO classes. They do not, however, limit their use of these
classes to packaged software firms. See Bronwyn H. Hall & Meghan MacGarvie, The
Private Value of Software Patents 16-19 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 12,195, May 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12195 (discussing data
sets that are not confined to packaged software firms).
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software patents assigned to other firms as well as software patents in
other patent classes.54
Another significant effort to identify a large set of software
patents, by James Bessen and Bob Hunt,55 defines "software patent"
to include patents on inventions in which the data processing
algorithms are carried out by code either stored on a magnetic
storage medium or embedded in chips ("firmware"). 56 Rejecting the
54. To get a sense of false positives and false negatives, we assessed how the two
Graham and Mowery approaches classified the 2,942 university patents issued in 2002. As
shown in the Appendix Tables Al and A2, very few of the patents classified by us as
nonsoftware were classified as software by either the GM-IPC approach or the GM-PTO
approach. However, the GM-IPC approach did not classify as software eighty-six percent
of the patents we classified as software. Similarly, the GM-PTO approach did not classify
as software eighty-two percent of the patents we classified as software. An analysis
conducted by Bronwyn Hall and Meghan MacGarvie compared Graham-Mowery with
earlier datasets manually compiled by Allison and determined that an approach that uses
patent classifications misses about fifty percent of software patents. See Hall &
MacGarvie, supra note 53, at 17 (finding mixed effects of changes in legal doctrine on
market value and stock returns of software firms).
Of course, as the analysis by Hall and MacGarvie suggests, see Table A2
Appendix infra, even significant percentages of Type I and Type II errors do not
necessarily have a systematic impact on regression results. In our case, however, since the
number of patents in our data set was tractable, and we needed to do manual work to
determine departmental origin in any event, see infra Part II.C, we preferred a more
precise approach.
55. See Bessen & Hunt, supra note 3.
56. As Bessen and Hunt note, one of the current authors, John Allison, earlier
employed a definition of software patent that excluded firmware, including only
inventions in which the code implementing the data processing algorithms are stored on a
magnetic storage medium. See John R. Allison & Mark Lemley, Who's Patenting What?
An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2110 (2000).
Allison also employed this definition in later articles. See John Allison & Mark Lemley,
The Growing Complexity of the Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77 (2002) (discussing
patent trends over the last thirty years); John Allison & Emerson Tiller, The Business
Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987 (2003) (arguing that business method
patents should not receive special treatment by the PTO). The reasons for using this
definition were a combination of initial doubt and compromise with a co-author, followed
by a need for consistency. Each of these articles made use of the same data set of 1,000
randomly selected patents issued between mid-1996 and mid-1998. After a great deal
more experience gained from closely reading thousands of computer-related patents,
Allison became convinced that the definition should include firmware. When he used the
same set of 1,000 randomly selected patents in a subsequent article, he studied each patent
again and reclassified them using a definition that included firmware. See generally John
R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004) (discussing characteristics of
litigated patents). Allison has used this more inclusive definition in studying the
approximately 20,000 patents issued during 1998-2002 to almost 1,000 firms appearing in
the Software 500 list in those years. This list ranks firms according to their gross revenues
in software and services and includes many firms that are primarily manufacturers in
addition to firms that produce only software. See John R. Allison et al., Software Patents,
Incumbents, and Entry, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1594-95 (2007) (detailing methodology).
See generally John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of Software
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use of patent classifications, 57 Bessen and Hunt study a random
sample of patents and classify them according to their definition.
Using characteristics of patents Bessen and Hunt find to fit their
definition, they then develop a keyword search algorithm to identify
software patents. 8
Although the Bessen and Hunt definition of software patent is
reasonable, there are pitfalls associated with using automated
keyword searches to identify such patents. From one of the co-
author's (John Allison's) study of thousands of computer-related
patents, it is clear that the use of language in the titles, abstracts,
written descriptions, and claims of patents, even in those dealing with
the same area of technology, can be highly idiosyncratic among
different patent owners. In general, a common criticism of patents in
the IT industries is that the industries lack a standardized vocabulary
for claims.59 Moreover, software is a critical part of inventions in so
many fields that reliance on particular search terms could produce a
data set that has both false positives and false negatives.6 °
Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 297 (2007) (analyzing firm-held patents and their
characteristics).
57. See Bessen & Hunt, supra note 3, at 163-64 (discussing methodology for
identifying software patents). The Bessen and Hunt definition of a software patent
appears to include patents on inventions that "use" software as part of the invention but
excludes those that "use" off-the-shelf software:
Our concept of software patent involves a logic algorithm for processing data that
is implemented via stored instructions; that is, the logic is not "hard-wired." These
instructions could reside on a disk or other storage medium or they could be
stored in "firmware," that is, a read-only memory, as is typical of embedded
software. But we want to exclude inventions that do not use software as part of
the invention. For example, some patents reference off-the-shelf software used to
determine key parameters of the invention; such uses do not make the patent a
software patent.
Id. at 163.
58. The keyword search algorithm initially identifies a set of patents that use the
words "software," "computer," or "program" in the claims or specification. Id. at 185.
Patents within the set that contain the word "semiconductor," "chip," "circuit,"
'circuitry," or "bus" are then excluded, as well as patents that contain the word "antigen,"
"antigenic," or "chromatography." Id.
59. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1.
60. See generally Bessen & Hunt, supra note 3 (identifying substantial degrees of over
and under inclusiveness in the data set generated by their keyword search). Table A3 in
the Appendix uses university patents issued in 2002 to compare the Bessen and Hunt
("BH") approach with our own approach. The two approaches yield an approximately
comparable number of total patents (396 patents using our approach versus 415 using the
BH approach). However, fifty-one percent of the patents our approach identifies as
software are not identified as such by the BH algorithm. Moreover, we classify as
nonsoftware fifty-three percent of the patents that BH classify as software. Similarly, one
recent study that uses software experts to read a sample of the BH patents asserts that
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Instead of relying upon prior approaches, we formulated a
definition of "software patent" based on the extensive experience one
of us (Allison) has had in reading software patents. Our definition of
software patent is "a patent in which at least one claim element
consists of data processing-the actual manipulation of data-
regardless of whether the code carrying out that data processing is on
a magnetic storage medium or embedded in a chip." Not only is it
possible to apply the definition consistently, but it also captures the
realities of claim drafting. In Allison's experience, patent claims
often include the prior art, with only one or two elements covering
the purportedly novel and nonobvious advance. For example, a claim
may read as though it covers a generic router, printer, magnetic
resonance imaging machine, or other hardware, when in fact the only
purported novelty is in one element consisting of a function carried
out by algorithms. Some of this may be a consequence of the fact
that, prior to Alappat and the 1996 PTO guidelines, software had to
be claimed not as a new algorithm per se but instead as a new
machine that allegedly did something different because of the new
algorithm.61 More fundamentally, a claim covers the entire invention,
and in a case like this, the entire invention is not just the new
algorithm in isolation; rather, it is a piece of hardware that allegedly
does something different because of the new algorithms.
In a large set of patents, it is a practical impossibility to include
only those patents in which the software element (as contrasted with
other elements of the invention) is novel and nonobvious. In order to
restrict ourselves to patents in which the software element was novel
and nonobvious, we would need to employ a person having ordinary
skill in the art to conduct a very thorough study of the relevant prior
art. Even then, the question would be plagued by doubt because
issues of novelty and nonobviousness are typically difficult to resolve
even after a full evidentiary exploration in court. But the fact that,
under our definition, the data processing must be identified in a claim
element does suggest that software is sufficiently important to novelty
and nonobviousness for the patent claim drafter to include it as a
limitation of the claim (thereby narrowing the claim). In other words,
it would be foolhardy for a patent attorney to include such an element
unless it was a critical part of the invention.
more than fifty percent represented Type II errors. See Anne Layne-Farrar, Defining
Software Patents: A Research Field Guide 1-21 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr., Working
Paper No. 05-14, Aug. 2005), available at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/
redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/phpAW.pdf.
61. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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Our approach does have limits. One problem with our approach
is that it involves the slow and laborious process of reading patents.
Although the decision on many patents is clear, there will always be a
substantial percentage that must be studied with great care.62
Moreover, a degree of subjective judgment is occasionally required.
However, at least in the case of a relatively small data set, we believe
that increased accuracy more than compensates for time intensity and
the absence of algorithmic criteria readily replicable by automated
methods. We do not claim that our data set of university-owned
software patents is perfect, but we do contend that our error rate is
very small-certainly smaller than in any data set acquired by means
of patent classifications or keyword searches.
In addition to identifying which patents out of the more than
7,600 university-owned patents in our sample are software patents, we
also identified a subset of those that may be called "pure software
patents." These are patents in which the claims consist only of data
processing-that is, the entire invention consists of algorithms.63 This
task required thorough study of each of the patents that had already
been identified as a software patent. Although the process of
identifying "pure" software patents was accomplished with a high
degree of accuracy, there was a small number about which reasonable
minds could differ. Thus, for this second stage, we also do not profess
to have achieved perfection, but we do maintain that our error rate is
very low.
62. However, if one is studying a large population of patents from the computer-
related industries, the percentage that must be carefully scrutinized is far higher than if
one is studying a population of patents across a broad array of fields (as in this Article).
63. These sorts of patents could presumably issue with any frequency only after the
Federal Circuit's 1994 Alappat decision. However, as discussed further below, see infra
Part V.A, even these pure software claims typically involve the use of a computer and, in
some cases, a trivial nondata processing element such as a generic input, output, or storage
element. Thus, they may survive even after In re Bilski.
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II. UNIVERSITY SOFTWARE PATENTING: TRENDS,
DETERMINANTS, AND DEPARTMENTAL ORIGIN
A. Trends




0 Other Software U Pure Software
Figure 1 shows that university software patenting increased more
than ten-fold over the 1982-2002 period, from thirty-seven patents in
1982 to 396 patents in 2002. Over this period, the "pure software"
proportion of university software patents also increased dramatically,
from thirteen percent to thirty-two percent of all university software
patents. The latter change is hardly surprising. While the
patentability of pure software was unclear in the 1980s, its status
became much more secure in the 1990s.' Over these two decades,
university software patenting also grew at a faster rate than university
patenting overall. As a consequence, the software share of university
patents rose from nine percent in 1982 to thirteen percent in 2002, as
seen in Figure 2.
64. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
1534 [Vol. 87
UNIVERSITY SOFTWARE OWNERSHIP












1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
Issue Year
Table 1 below lists the fifteen universities that received the most
software patents in 2002.65 Together, these fifteen institutions
accounted for sixty percent of all university software patents issued in
2002. The top five institutions alone-the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology ("MIT"), the University of California, Stanford
University ("Stanford"), the California Institute of Technology
("Caltech"), and the University of Texas-accounted for over a third
(34.2%) of all university software patents. The top five patentees also
represented the top five university patentees overall in 2002.
However, moving further down the list of the top fifteen, we see that
a number of the top software patentees are not among the top
university patentees overall. The University of Washington (sixth in
software patenting/fifteenth in overall patenting), the Georgia
Institute of Technology ("Georgia Tech") (eighth/twentieth),
Carnegie Mellon (ninth/fifty-first), the University of Rochester
(twelfth/fiftieth) and the University of Illinois (fourteenth/twenty-
eighth) particularly stand out as institutions substantially more
prominent in software patenting than overall patenting.
65. To be sure, the 2002 data may be somewhat unusual in that it reflects patent
filings that occurred during the "dot-coin" bubble of the late 1990s. However, with a few
exceptions, these universities also received the largest number of software patents over the
course of the sampling.
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Table 1: University Software Patenting, Overall Patenting, and
Pure Software Patenting in 2002
Rank in Patenting (Issue Year 2002)
Pure
University Software Overall Software
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology 1 2 1
University of California 2 1 2
Stanford University 3 4 4
California Institute of
Technology 4 3 23
University of Texas 5 5 41
University of Washington 6 15 6
University of Wisconsin 7 7 8
Georgia Institute of
Technology 8 20 3
Carnegie Mellon University 9 51 13
Johns Hopkins University 10 6 11
State University of New
York 11 8 20
University of Rochester 12 50 14
University of Pennsylvania 13 13 42
University of Illinois 14 28 5
Columbia University 15 14 10
With respect to the patenting of "pure" software, Table 1 shows
that the top three patenting institutions overall also ranked among
the top recipients of pure software patents (first, second, and fourth).
In contrast, although Caltech and the University of Texas ranked high
in overall software patenting (fourth and fifth, respectively), they
ranked relatively low in the patenting of pure software (twenty-third
and forty-first, respectively). The University of Washington, Georgia
Tech, Carnegie Mellon, the University of Rochester, and the
University of Illinois-mentioned earlier as standing out in software
patenting relative to overall patenting-also stand out with respect to
numbers of pure software patents (sixth, third, thirteenth, fourteenth,
and eleventh, respectively).
As these examples suggest, several factors may affect university
software patenting. First, the amount of software-related R&D, and
thus the output of software, may matter. Second, the size of the
overall research enterprise may matter, because software can be
[Vol. 871536
UNIVERSITY SOFTWARE OWNERSHIP
developed in many parts of the university. Third, an individual
university's nonsoftware-related propensity to patent, i.e., the share
of nonsoftware research outputs it patents (either because its
researchers are prone to file invention disclosure statements and push
for patents on those disclosures or because technology transfer
officers are prone to seek patents on disclosures), may also affect
software patenting.66 Although there are undoubtedly other factors
that affect software patenting-for example, how software ownership
in particular is viewed in the technology licensing office or among
faculty 67-these factors are difficult to measure quantitatively. We
examine some of these factors in our qualitative analyses below.
B. Patent Production Functions
To examine the relationship of software R&D, overall R&D, and
nonsoftware patent propensity to university level software patenting,
we collected data on R&D funds as well as nonsoftware patenting for
all of the 202 Carnegie research universities in our sample. The unit
of analysis for the "patent production functions" we estimate is a
university in a given issue year. For each institution, we created
variables measuring the number of software patents and number of
other patents issued in 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. We used the
National Science Foundation's WebCaspar database6 8 to collect R&D
data for these universities for the 1977-2002 time period.69
Specifically, we collected data on computer science R&D and overall
R&D and used this information to construct variables measuring the
sum of computer science and other R&D over the previous five years.
The main empirical analyses relate a university's software patenting
to its nonsoftware patenting in a given issue year and to its computer
66. In our quantitative discussion, we cannot distinguish between motivations of
university technology transfer offices and motivations of university scientists. In any
event, these motivations may be related. For example, Azoulay et al., supra note 11, at
600, 615-19, find that in a study of 3,862 life sciences researchers, the overall "patent
stock" of the university where the researcher is employed has an effect on the number of
patents held by the life sciences researcher.
67. In the life sciences context, for example, one study that examined patenting
activity for 3,862 researchers found that having co-authors who patent has a positive effect
on patenting behavior. Id. at 615.
68. This database is available at WebCASPAR: Integrated Science and Engineering
Resources Data System, http://caspar.nsf.gov (follow "Info" hyperlink for "NSF Survey of
R&D Expenditures at Universities and Colleges") (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
69. This database uses information from NSF's Survey of R&D Expenditures at
Universities and Colleges, a survey conducted annually by NSF's Division of Science
Resource Statistics. For more on this data source, see id. (follow "Info" hyperlink for
"NSF Survey of R&D Expenditures at Universities and Colleges").
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science R&D and other R&D over the five years prior. We decided
to use a five-year time frame because it is difficult to estimate
precisely when the research that led to a particular invention
disclosure (let alone patent application or issued patent) was
conducted. By using a relatively long time frame, we aimed to get a
sense of the research commitment of the university, both inside and
outside the software arena, around the time an invention disclosure
was likely to have been submitted.7"
To facilitate interpretation, we took natural logarithms of the
independent variables.71 Because the dependent variables are integer
valued, we estimated negative binomial regressions relating software
patents and pure software patents to research expenditures.72 Tables
2 through 6 show the main results from these simple cross-sectional
regressions for 1982 to 2002, respectively.
Table 2: Negative Binomial Models, Determinants of 1982 Software
Patenting
Modell ModeI2 Model3 Model4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
In Lagged CS Funds .218* .167 .770** .748**
(.129) (.124) (336) (358)
In Lagged Other Funds .612** -.043 1.435** .709
(.270) (.193) (.65) (.774)
In Other Patents 1.326** .742
(.272) (.501)
Const. -10.317*** -4.045** -27.910** -19.811*
(2M84) (1.7M3 (8.697) (10.044)
Obs. 202 202 202 202
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes p<.O01, ** denotes p<.01, and * denotes p<.05.
70. For purposes of our regression analyses, the strong persistence in university-level
R&D funding and composition over time is very helpful. As one indicator of this,
computer science R&D funding at a point in time has a correlation of 0.965 with its sum
over the previous five years, and other R&D funding has a correlation of 0.996 with its
sum over the previous five years.
71. Following convention, we use natural logs of one plus the variable.
72. We could not reject the hypothesis of overdispersion and thus chose negative
binomial models over Poisson models. However, we obtained qualitatively similar results
from Poisson models with standard errors adjusted to account for overdispersion and from




The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 is the number of software
patents issued to a university in a given year. In Models 3 and 4, the
dependent variable is the number of pure software patents.
In negative binomial models, coefficients on log-transformed
variables can be interpreted as elasticities. Model 1 for the 1982
sample (Table 2) shows that both computer science R&D and other
R&D are related to software patenting. Upon introducing the
nonsoftware patenting variable, neither of the R&D variables is
significant, but the number of nonsoftware patents is, with a one
percent increase in other patenting associated with a 1.3% increase in
software patenting. Both software and nonsoftware R&D are related
to the number of pure software patents (Model 3), but the latter is no
longer statistically significant after introducing the nonsoftware
patenting variable. Thus, the only clear implication of the 1982
cohort is the strong correlation of nonsoftware patenting with overall
software patents.
Table 3: Negative Binomial Models, Determinants of 1987 Software
Patenting
Modell Mode12 Mode13 Modef4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
In Lagged CS Funds *33*** .314** .289 .210
(122) (.092) (.194) (.162)
In Lagged Other Funds 1.013*** .291 .864** .094
(M26) (.198) (.351) (319)
In Other Patents .797*** 1.035***
(163) (M3)
Const. -16.411*** -8.430*** -15.243*** -6.796**
(2.59) (2-117) (3.79) C3261)
Obs. 202 202 202 202
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** denotes p<.001, ** denotes p<.01, and 0 denotes p<.05.
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Table 4: Negative Binomial Models, Determinants of 1992 Software
Patenting
Modell Model2 Model3 Model4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
In Lagged CS Funds .143* .082 .122 .071
(.0n) (.973) (.110) (.107)
In Lagged Other Funds 1.0830** .34" .968*** .264
(.192) (.206) (.2M7) (.323)
In Other Patents 1.0270** .955***
(.199) (318)
Coast. -15.295*** -7.610** -14.735*** -7392**
(Z.213) (2-221) (3.37) (3.446)
Obs. 202 202 202 202
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 9** denotes p<.001, ** denotes p<.O1, and " denotes p< 5.
Tables 3 and 4 show that, in 1987 and 1992, once nonsoftware
patents are taken into account, neither computer science nor other
R&D has a consistently strong association with either overall
software patenting or pure software patenting. Nonsoftware
patenting is, however, strongly related to software patenting and pure
software patenting, after controlling for R&D. Depending on the
specific model and gear, elasticities range from 0.797 to 1.035.
Table 5: Negative Binomial Models, Determinants of 1997 Software
Patenting
Modell Model2 Model3 Model4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
In Lagged CS Funds .245*5* .172"* .348*** .275**
(.76) (.072) (134) (A31)
In Lagged Other Funds .986"** .308 1.005*** .271
060) (Ow6) (. 25) (320)
In Other Patents .832**0 .813"*
(.195) (.2M)
Const. -14.941*** -7.394*** -17.358** -9.023**
(lips) (2-79) (2975) (15K7)
Obs. 202 202 202 202
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes p<.001, ** denotes p<.01, and 0 denotes p<.05
1540 [Vol. 87
UNIVERSITY SOFTWARE OWNERSHIP
Table 6: Negative Binomial Models, Determinants of 2002 Software
Patenting
Modell ModeI2 Model3 Modei4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
In Lagged CS Funds .110"* .097** 588- 523***
(.049) (.045) (121) (.110)
In Lagged Other Funds .839*** .073 .23 -.395"*
(.118) (A41) (.1611 (.163)
In Other Patents .910** .781***
(.141) (.167)
Const. -11.577*** -3.613** -9.017*** -2.182
(1.406) (1510) (1.615) (1576)
Obs. 202 202 202 202
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 0*0 denotes p<.001, *4 denotes p<. 1G, and 0 denotes p<.0 5 .
Further, Tables 5 and 6 show that, after the mid-1990s-the post-
Alappat73 era-universities that had larger stocks of computer science
R&D also tended to do more software patenting and pure software
patenting. This conclusion is consistent with the descriptive data for
issue year 2002 in Table 1. In each of the models, however, after
controlling for computer science R&D and other R&D, nonsoftware
patenting was significantly related to both software patenting and
pure software patenting, with elasticities ranging from 0.78 to 0.91
depending on the specific model and year.
The finding that nonsoftware patenting (conditional on overall
and computer science R&D) has a qualitatively and statistically
significant relationship with software patenting suggests that
universities with a higher nonsoftware patenting propensity also tend
to patent more software.
This correlation between nonsoftware and software patenting
propensity could be driven by a number of factors. One potentially
omitted variable from the analyses above is university success in
getting patent applications issued. If some universities are
systematically better at securing patents, this could drive the observed
correlation even if the propensity to file patent applications on
software is unrelated to the propensity to file applications on other
inventions. We explored this question for the 2002 cohort for the
73. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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subset of 130 universities where AUTM data on "application success"
were available.74
Table 7: Negative Binomial Models, Determinants of 2002 Software
Patenting, A UTM Universities
Modell Model2 Model3 Model4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
In Lagged CS Funds .10D* .537** .091 .583***
(.046) (.11) (.A57) (.120)
In Lagged Other Funds -.040 -.524** .428"* -.008
(.169) (.235) (202) (.2-4)
In Other Patents .807*** .717"**
(.160) (.219)
Application Success Rate -.207 .068
(.360) (.426)
In TTO FiEs .503** .407*
(.20) (.247)
Const. -1.663 -.317 -6.420*** -6.356**
(1-914) (2J530) (2-468) (3.W4)
Obs. 130 130 101 101
Ronbust standard errors in parentheses. *0 denotes p<,001, *4 denotes p<.01, and * denotes p<.05.
As Models 1 and 2 in Table 7 show, for all software patents and pure
software patents respectively, application success is not significantly
related to software patenting.
Another possible explanation for the correlation between
nonsoftware and software patenting propensity could be scale
economies: the marginal costs of obtaining a software patent (or any
additional patent) may be lower for universities that have larger
technology transfer operations. To test this possibility, we used data
on the size of technology transfer offices. Reports from the
Association of University Technology Managers contain data on the
number of licensing officers employed by each university in 2002,
though only for a subset (102) of universities in our sample.75 Models
74. More specifically, data on the number of patent applications filed by the university
were available. Combining this data with PTO data on issued patents based on 2002
applications (as of December 2007) allowed us to measure the university's "application
success." Because the application success variable captures university patent prosecution
ability based on applications filed in 2002 (and issued over the next five years) rather than
in the years prior to the issuance of the 2002 patents, the application success measure is
potentially a noisy one. However, we suspect that university success in obtaining patents
is relatively invariant over time.
75. Association of University Technology Managers, FY 2002 AUTM Licensing
Survey (on file with author).
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3 and 4 in Table 7 show that, after controlling for nonsoftware and
software R&D, this variable is significantly related to both pure and
software patenting, consistent with the scale economies hypothesis.
Finally, we estimated a panel version of these regressions for the
entire period with university and year fixed effects. In this model, the
estimated changes in R&D and other patenting are identified using
within-university variation over time. Thus, any time invariant
university factors (including "fixed" university technology transfer
abilities) would not affect estimates from this model.




Log Lagged CS Funds .039 .107
(.047) (.096)
Log Lagged Other Funds -.397 -.118
(.289) (mg2)
Log Other Patents .457-** .054
(.093) (.167)
Year Dummy 1987 .688*** 1.363*0(.244) (.Ms3)
Year Dummy 1992 1.381** 2.193"-*
(.324) (.754)
Year Dummy 1997 1.767** 2.708***
(.400) (.897)





All models include university fixed effects. The left-cut year category is 1982. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* denotes p<.001, ** denotes p<.01, and * denotes pe-05.
Table 8 shows the results. Notably, the year dummies are
positive and their magnitude increases over time, reflecting the
overall growth in university patenting over the 1982-2002 period.
Model 1 shows that the main factor affecting overall software
patenting is changes in nonsoftware patenting, with a one percent
increase in nonsoftware patenting implying a 0.46% increase in
software patenting. The corresponding finding for pure software
patenting is neither qualitatively nor statistically significant.
Additionally, none of the R&D measures are statistically significant
for either software or pure software. This last set of results should be
interpreted with caution, however. Because the panels are short and
there is limited within-university variation, it is difficult to draw
strong inferences.
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Taken together, we read these results as consistent with the
impressions from our interviews (discussed below) that university
software patenting practices are related to their nonsoftware
patenting practices. An ideal test of this hypothesis would control for
the number of disclosed software inventions for which patents would
indeed facilitate technology transfer. If we had such a measure, and
found that nonsoftware patent propensity nonetheless affected the
volume of software patenting, this would provide strong support for
the argument that university software patenting is less about
"technology transfer" and more about "business as usual."
Unfortunately, such a measure is unlikely to be obtained.76
C. Departmental Origin
To explore the sources of software patenting in greater detail, we
also identified the departmental origin of the inventors in the top
fifteen academic software patentees in 2002. As noted above, these
institutions accounted for sixty percent of 2002's overall academic
software patenting.77
These 241 patents had 544 distinct inventors. Based on web
searches, we were able to locate the primary departmental affiliation
for 73.5% (400) of these inventors. Seen another way, these 241
patents include 661 unique inventor-patent dyads. For example, if an
inventor is included on three patents, she generates three inventor-
patent dyads. For 26.5% of these dyads, we could not identify the
inventor's department.
Table 9: Departmental Origin of Inventors on Software Patents Issued
to the Top Fifteen Recipients of Software Patents in Issue Year 2002
Department N Percent Cumulative Percent
EE/CS 47 9.67 9.67
Electrical Engineering 47 9.67 19.34
Computer Science 42 8.64 27.98
Neuroscience 23 4.73 32.72
Robotics Institute 23 4.73 37.45
Medical Physics 20 4.12 41.56
Radiology 19 3.91 45.47
Lawrence Livermore 15 3.09 4856
Chemistry 13 2.67 51.23
Mechanical Engineering 12 2.47 53.70
Counts and percentages calculated at the patent-inventor level
76. Another limitation of our data is that we must rely on R&D generally (and
computer science R&D in particular) as an imperfect proxy for the volume of software
output at a university.
77. See supra Part II.A.
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Table 9 shows the top ten departments for dyads where the
department is known. Slightly fewer than thirty percent of the
inventors are from electrical engineering, computer science, and joint
EE/CS departments. Moreover, consistent with arguments that
software is produced across the university, a number of biomedical
departments are also represented, including Neuroscience,
Radiology, and Medical Physics. To the extent that software is being
treated just like other inventions for purposes of patenting, this may
be in part because a significant proportion of it emerges from
biomedical departments where patenting is the norm. In this regard,
it bears emphasis that, of the 970 software patents in our overall
sampling, 333 (more than one-third) represented software with
biomedical applications.
Table 10: Departmental Origin of Inventors for Pure Software Patents
Issued to the Top Fifteen Recipients of Software Patents in Issue Year
2002
Department N Percent Cumulative Percent
Computer Science 33 23.57 23.57
EE/CS 29 20.71 44.29
Electrical Engineering 12 8.57 52.86
Lincoln Laboratory 6 4.9 57.14
Aeronautics and Astronautics 5 3.57 60.71
Robotics Institute 5 3.57 64.29
Agricultural and Biological Engineering 3 2.14 66.43
Chemistry and Biochemistry 3 2.14 68.57
Mathematics 3 2.14 70.71
Biostatistics and Medical Informatics 2 1.43 72.14
Counts and percentages calculated at the patent-inventor level
Table 10 shows the analogous table for pure software patents.
Perhaps not surprisingly, more than half of the patent-inventor dyads
on pure software patents emanate from electrical engineering,
computer science or joint EE/CS departments. Other departments
are less prominent in production of pure software patents than they
are in the production of other software patents.
III. UNIVERSITY OWNERSHIP POLICIES
Our quantitative results demonstrate that, on the whole, for
software patent applications filed in the 1980s and 1990s, universities
appeared to take a "one size fits all" approach to technology. Those
universities that tended to file a lot of nonsoftware patents also filed a
lot of software patents (both ordinary software and pure software).
15452009]
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The regression results underscore what can be seen through a casual
review of the descriptive statistics in Table 4: the top five software
patentees in 2002-MIT, University of California, Stanford, Caltech,
and the University of Texas-were also the top five overall patentees.
Notably, none of these five was in the top five in computer science
R&D spending for the years 1996-1998.
On the other hand, a qualitative review of our descriptive data
also indicates some anomalies in this general pattern. For example,
of the top five software patentees in 2002, two-Caltech and the
University of Texas-did not have significant numbers of pure
software patents.7 8  Moreover, five universities-the University of
Washington, Georgia Tech, Carnegie Mellon University, the
University of Rochester, and the University of Illinois-rank
substantially higher in software/pure software patenting than in
overall patenting.
In order to get a more fine-grained sense of factors that might be
influencing individual universities, we investigated technology
transfer policies at the fifteen universities that received the most
software patents in 2002. In addition to reviewing publicly available
materials, we conducted interviews with two groups of relevant
parties: (1) technology transfer managers responsible for software at
the universities;79 and (2) academics and graduate students prominent
in software development. The latter group was selected through
snowball sampling. Interviews were conducted by telephone, lasted
approximately forty-five minutes to one hour, and were semi-
structured. On occasion, follow-up discussions were necessary and
were conducted either via e-mail or by telephone. A list of questions
asked in each interview is attached as Appendix A."°
As an initial matter, several of the interviews confirmed the
results of our quantitative analysis-that technology transfer officers
treat software like other inventions. Lita Nelsen, director of the MIT
technology transfer office noted that, when discussing pure software,
"if there are no strong feelings on the part of the authors to open
source their work, we will look at it like any other invention."81
78. Caltech and the University of Texas ranked twenty-third and forty-first,
respectively.
79. We were able to obtain interviews with officials at all technology transfer offices
except Caltech and Columbia University.
80. All interviews were recorded; transcripts of recordings (with portions where
interviewees wished to remain anonymous deleted) are available upon request from the
authors.
81. E-mail from Lita Nelsen, Director, MIT Tech. Licensing Office, to Colin
Crossman, Faculty Fellow, Duke Law Sch. (July 27, 2005, 13:45 EST) (on file with the
1546 [Vol. 87
UNIVERSITY SOFTWARE OWNERSHIP
Our qualitative investigation also suggested reasons for the
relatively low numbers of pure software patents at the University of
Texas and Caltech. At the University of Texas, complaints from
computer science faculty resulted in the explicit adoption of a policy
allowing faculty freedom to share their work as they wanted.82 Such
freedom includes express permission to use the GNU General Public
License ("GPL"), a "viral" open source license that requires software
source code to be open but also requires those who redistribute the
software to make any modifications they have made to the source
code available.83 This policy was adopted in the 1990s and, therefore,
would have affected the number of pure software patents that issued
in 2002.84
The explanation for Caltech's small number of pure software
patents is less transparent. Because we were unable to speak with the
technology licensing office,85 our knowledge of the Caltech situation
is based on reports from scientists who work there. According to one
prominent open source software developer at Caltech, most software
developed there is for internal, in-house use and is probably not even
reported to the technology transfer office.86 For software that is
reported, the faculty researcher decides how the software should be
exploited.87 The technology transfer office is not only familiar with
open source but is apparently eager to use the viral GPL license; the
viral GPL allows for the future possibility of "forking," with one fork
continuing to be available without charge via the GPL and the other
North Carolina Law Review). According to Nelsen, software tends to be worth patenting
when the primary value is in the algorithm and when it is likely to give "a substantial
return." Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Gerald Barnett, Dir., Univ. of Wash.,
Software & Copyright Ventures (Oct. 2, 2003) (emphasis added) (noting that universities
that have a long history of patenting tend to see software, including pure software, through
the lens they use for other invention).
82. Telephone Interview with Georgia Harper, Attorney, Intellectual Prop. Section,
Univ. of Tex. Office of Gen. Counsel (Feb. 26, 2004).
83. For information about the GPL license, see GNU General Public License, Free
Software Foundation, Inc. (3d version, June 29, 2007), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/
gpl.html.
84. See Telephone Interview with Georgia Harper, supra note 82. Various University
of Texas websites document the University's continuing support of open source under
GPL or similar licenses where the faculty inventor and a software consultant determine
that such distribution is in the best interest of the University and the public. See, e.g.,
Administrative Policy Regarding Disclosure, Distribution and Licensing Software,
University of Texas (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/
swadmpol.htm.
85. The Caltech technology transfer staff refused requests for an interview.
86. Telephone Interview with C. Titus Brown, Graduate Student, Cal. Inst. of Tech.,
Dept. of Biology (Aug. 17, 2005).
87. Id.
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fork converted into a nonviral license for which corporate clients
might be willing to pay.88
In contrast, the positions of two of the other top five software
patentees-MIT and the University of California-are (or at least
have been) less explicitly favorable to open source.89 According to
MIT's director of technology transfer, MIT allows researchers to use
the open source approach, and even manages their licenses, but this
position is not part of an official policy.90 The University of California
system appears to have a highly complex set of positions on open
source licensing. While some campuses, such as Berkeley and San
Diego, are familiar with the open source model, other campuses are
less so.9  Complexity is compounded by the fact that various
important campuses, including Berkeley, have been actively fine-
tuning their policies.92 As of early 2002, officials from the Berkeley
office were quoted as criticizing the decision made by Berkeley a
decade earlier, in 1992, to release as open source the Unix operating
system and TCP/IP networking protocol.93 At about the same time,
Berkeley computational biologist Steven Brenner encountered
difficulties in releasing his lab's software under an open source
license.94
As for the five schools that rank substantially higher in
software/pure software patenting than in other patenting-the
University of Washington, Georgia Tech, Carnegie Mellon, the
University of Rochester, and the University of Illinois-the first three
of these schools have unique characteristics that may explain their
high levels of pure software patenting. At the University of
Washington, a separate technology licensing office, now called the
Digital Ventures Office, is responsible for managing pure software
88. See id.
89. Where Stanford University fits in the picture is not clear. Stanford did not adopt
an explicit policy in favor of open source until 2004. It adopted this policy in response to a
number of requests received from professors. See Telephone Interview with Katherine
Ku, Dir., Stanford Office of Tech. Licensing (Sept. 6, 2005). However, Stanford has long
had a policy allowing professors to put their inventions into the public domain if they so
desire.
90. Telephone Interview with Lita Nelsen, Dir., Mass. Inst. of Tech. Licensing Office
(Aug. 8, 2005).
91. Telephone Interview with William Decker, Assoc. Dir., Univ. of Cal. at San Diego
Tech. Transfer Office (Aug. 28, 2003).
92. See infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
93. See Jeffrey Benner, Public Money, Private Code, SALON, Jan. 4, 2002,
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature2002/01/04/university-open-source/index.html.
94. Telephone Interview with Steven Brenner, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Cal. at
Berkeley Dept. of Plant & Microbial Biology (Mar. 8, 2004).
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(and digital products more generally)." By 2005, the office employed
seven full-time professionals as well as two to four part-time
students.96 As for Georgia Tech, its level of computer science R&D
funding relative to other funding is quite high-it ranks fifth in
computer science funding and only thirty-second in other funding.
Finally, Carnegie Mellon ranks second in computer science funding
and eighty-seventh in other funding. Carnegie Mellon is also home to
the Software Engineering Institute ("SEI"), a research consortium
founded by software firms.97 Patents from SEI are assigned to
Carnegie Mellon, and the software firms in the consortium receive an
automatic, royalty-free license.98
IV. UNIVERSITY SOFTWARE OWNERSHIP: A POLICY ANALYSIS
A. General Considerations
Our results indicate that universities have become active
patentees of software, including pure software. They have clearly
availed themselves of the opportunities afforded by the Bayh-Dole
Act and the Federal Circuit decisions in the 1990s. Moreover, at least
for our sample-which, because of prosecution lag time, terminates
with patents filed around 2000-behavior with respect to total
software patents and pure software patents is strongly affected by
nonsoftware patent propensity. Although there are anomalies in the
overall pattern-largely explicable through policies at particular
universities that either strongly favor open source or favor a
particular focus on software 99-the correlation is clear.
From a private point of view, this correlation may make sense,
especially if the reason for the effect is, as some of our data suggests,
economies of scale at the technology transfer office.l°° To the extent
such scale economies exist, they are likely to lower the private
95. Digital Ventures Home Page, http://depts.washington.edu/ventures/ (last visited
Apr. 29, 2007).
96. Telephone Interviews with Charles Williams, Dir., Univ. of Wash. Digital
Ventures (Apr. 21, 2004 & Sept. 1, 2005).
97. See Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering Institute, http://www.sei.
cmu.edu/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
98. Telephone Interview with Carl P. Mahler II, Dir. of Intellectual Prop., Ctr. for
Tech. Transfer & Entm't (Sept. 2, 2005).
99. See supra Part III.
100. See David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and Licensing University
Inventions: Lessons from the History of the Research Corporation, 10 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 317,322-24 (2001).
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marginal cost of patent acquisition. 0' From a social point of view,
however, patenting based on scale economies is quite problematic.
Ideally, we would want decisions about whether to patent publicly
funded academic research to be based not only on the private
marginal costs of patent acquisition, but also on whether a patent is
needed to facilitate commercialization in a specific case, which is
likely to vary across inventions and fields.
Stated differently, a lack of differentiation between software and
other research could be problematic. As the data on the varying
importance of patents as incentives in different industries suggests,0 2
and as case study research on the disparate development trajectories
of university technologies specifically emphasizes,0 3 the optimal
mode of university-industry technology transfer is likely to vary by
industry and invention.0 4 More specifically, as indicated earlier, the
theory espoused in the legislative history of Bayh-Dole-that patents
and exclusive licenses are necessary to create incentives for firms to
develop and commercialize "embryonic" university inventions' 015-
does not apply neatly in the software context, where development
costs are often low relative to other types of inventions.1 6
Another major argument often advanced in favor of patents is
that the prospect of licensing royalties induces university researchers
to work with industry licensees and thereby transfer tacit knowledge
101. See id. at 325.
102. See Cohen et al., supra note 13, at 5-30 (examining the diverse methods used by
R&D labs to protect profits made from their inventions, as well as the diverse motives to
patent across different industries).
103. See generally Jeannette Colyvas et al., How Do University Inventions Get into
Practice, 48 MGMT. Sci. 61 (2002) (discussing eleven case studies from Columbia
University and Stanford University).
104. In addition to differential incentive effects, university patents and licenses have
different informational effects across different industries. Of particular relevance to our
study, the comprehensive Carnegie Mellon survey, conducted on a broad range of large
and small firms in the early 1990s, indicates that outside of the pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industries, industrial R&D managers rate patents and licenses very low
relative to other sources of information on public research (e.g., publications, conferences,
informal interaction with university researchers, and consulting). See Cohen et al., supra
note 13, at 4-5 (surveying various sizes of firms and their R&D managers). Even within
the pharmaceutical industry, patents and licenses were less important than research
publications and conferences. Id.
105. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
106. To be sure, such costs may be higher in situations where the software is not pure
software. However, even in those cases, to the extent that the novel or nonobvious




necessary for commercialization. 7 Although this argument could in
theory be compatible with exclusive or nonexclusive licenses, the
assumption tends to be that an academic researcher would have
sufficient time for only one exclusive licensee. However, in
comparison to the life sciences, software (particularly pure software)
is an area of invention where knowledge is likely to be relatively
codified. Object-oriented programming is based on principles of
modular design, and one of the reasons that open source methods of
software production have been successful is that the development
task can be broken up into modular pieces that are then
reassembled. 118 So, the need for transfer of tacit knowledge may not
be as pervasive as it is in the life sciences.
Indeed, in some well known cases, it appears that the university
patent allowed the university and/or its exclusive licensee to extract
rents from other firms without aiding in technology transfer. For
example, in the prominent case of Eolas Technologies, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp.," it does not appear that Microsoft's
commercialization was aided by the activities of the University of
California/Eolas." 0 Even worse, in Eolas, the university patent was
arguably being used to "holdup" the commercializer-that is, to use
the threat of injunctive relief to extract rents significantly larger than
the inventive contribution made by the patentee (and thus also
significantly larger than any licensing fee the university inventor
could have charged ex ante)."'
107. The evidence generally cited for this argument is survey data presented in Richard
Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University
Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 240 (2001). The Jensen and Thursby survey of sixty-
two technology transfer offices ("TTO") found that TfO managers thought that inventor
involvement was often important in the commercialization of inventions. Id. at 255.
108. See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112
YALE L.J., 369, 383-88 (2002).
109. 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
110. According to a University of California website on the Eolas case, Microsoft and
other firms were approached about licensing the technology in 1994 but declined to do so.
University of California, Questions and Answers About UCJEolas Patent Infringement
Suit Against Microsoft, http://www.ucop.edu/news/archives/2003/augllartlqanda.htm (last
visited Apr. 21, 2009).
111. The legal and economic literature on holdup through property rights assertion
(both within and outside the patent context) is voluminous. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94
Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 127-28 (1999) (summarizing literature). For a recent contribution, see
Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991,
2008-10 (2007).
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B. The Problem of Holdup Litigation
In order to study the litigation question more systematically, we
conducted two somewhat related empirical inquiries.112 First, we used
four different search methods to collect case studies involving
university software litigation.'13 Second, by running the patents in our
database against the Derwent LitAlert database of patent cases filed,
we determined whether the software patents in our sample were
litigated at rates higher (or lower) than the nonsoftware patents in
our sample." 4
With respect to the latter inquiry, there was no statistically
significant difference in rates of litigation between the software and
nonsoftware patents in our sample."5 However, we did generate a
number of case studies in which university software patents appear to
have been used in a manner that hindered, rather than promoted,
commercialization. Research Corporation Technologies ("RCT"), a
firm that is the assignee of patents from the University of Rochester,
has actively pursued litigation on a group of six patents covering the
112. To our knowledge, empirical work on university patent litigation has not been
technology specific. The empirical work to date indicates that, across all technologies,
university patents are litigated at about the same rate as other patents; that such litigation
has tripled in the period from 1985-2000; and that litigation tends to consume time and
resources that might otherwise be spent in marketing technology and establishing licenses.
See Scott Shane & Deepak Somaya, The Effects of Patent Litigation on University
Licensing Efforts, 63 J. ECON. & BEHAV. ORG. 739, 740-41 (2007).
113. Specifically, we gleaned our cases from four sources: (1) searches of the U.S.
Patent Quarterly ("USPQ") database for cases where a university was a party to the
litigation; (2) searches of the Derwent LitAlert database for cases where a university was a
litigation party; (3) searches of general news databases for discussions of university-related
patent litigation; and (4) running the patent numbers for all university software patents in
our database against the LitAlert database. All inquiries were conducted through
September 2006. When we found cases of interest, we used PACER docket records to
supplement our inquiry. In general, our discussion of cases is unlikely to be biased based
on underinclusiveness. The USPQ database is underinclusive to the extent that it contains
information only about cases from which a written order has emerged. Although the
LitAlert database is supposed to include all cases involving a patent, it actually includes a
little over half of such cases. See Deepak Somaya, Strategic Determinants of Decisions Not
to Settle Patent Litigation, 24 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 17, 21-22 (2008). However, there is no
reason to believe the underinclusiveness is biased in favor of, or against, software patent
litigation.
114. This patent search includes all cases filed before September 2006. As noted
earlier, although this database is underinclusive, there is no reason to believe its
underinclusiveness is biased in favor of or against software patent litigation. These results
are available upon request.
115. In part, this may be because the total numbers (five software cases and forty-six
nonsoftware cases filed with respect to the patents in our sample) were small.
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so-called Blue Noise Mask printing technology. 16 This technology,
which was developed at the University of Rochester and assigned to
RCT under a technology evaluation and commercialization
agreement dating back to 1953, allows for high-quality "half-tone"
printing. 17 It is used by firms ranging from Hewlett-Packard to
Microsoft.118 The firm's website emphasizes the patent suits it has
brought against Hewlett-Packard, Epson, and Microsoft and "invites
current and potential users of this landmark technology to contact
[RCT] about licenses under RCT's patent rights."'. 9  The lawsuits
against Hewlett-Packard and Epson were settled in 1999 and 2001,
respectively. 12° The litigation against Microsoft is ongoing.
21
MIT and its exclusive licensee, Akamai, were recently involved
in lawsuits against two firms, Speedera Networks Inc. and C&W
Wireless Internet Services, that allegedly infringed the MIT/Akamai
patent on software for decreasing congestion and delay in accessing
web pages on the Internet.1 22  The Akamai technology, which was
launched in 1999 at the height of the "dot-com" boom, was similar to
technologies developed by other firms before Akamai.1 23 The district
court granted a permanent injunction upon finding that the patent
was valid and had been infringed. 24 On appeal, however, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the broadest
claims of the patent were invalid, because the C&W software actually
predated them.125
In other cases, university patents have been asserted for large
damage awards (usually for the statutory maximum of six years of
past infringement) immediately before they are about to expire. For
example, MIT and an exclusive licensee, Electronics for Imaging,
have sued ninety-two firms, including Microsoft and IBM, alleging
116. See Research Corporation Technologies, Licensing: Blue Noise Mask,





121. Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., No. CV-01-658-TUC-MLR, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 66875 (D. Ariz. June 13, 2006), vacated, 536 F.3d 1246, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
122. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. C&W Internet Servs., 344 F.3d 1186, 1188-89 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
123. Id. at 1193 (quoting Akamai brief noting this point).
124. Id. at 1188.
125. Id. at 1194-95. Even the narrower claims were found valid only because the
Federal Circuit required C&W to establish that there be a "suggestion or motivation to
combine" prior art references. Id. at 1196. This "suggestion" test has been controversial
and the rigid application of it was recently rejected by the Supreme Court in KSR v.
Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
2009] 1553
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
infringement of a patent covering image-editing software.'26 This
lawsuit was filed in December 2001, six months before the patent was
set to expire. 127 The technology in question is a color imaging method
that can be applied to any system that produces color pictures.
128
Similarly, in March and May of 2005, a few months before the
relevant patent was due to expire, the University of Texas filed three
lawsuits against a total of forty-two electronics manufacturers alleging
infringement on a software patent that allows text messaging through
a standard telephone keypad. 129 In some cases, the patent in question
may not be due to expire immediately, but it is nonetheless relatively
old. In 2002, for example, Cornell sued Hewlett-Packard over a 1989
patent obtained by a Cornell professor for a technique that
accelerates a computer's processing speed. 3 ° Similarly, a 2001 suit by
MIT against Lockheed-Martin involved a 1989 patent on systems for
analyzing acoustic waveforms."'
In all of these cases, commercialization by firms other than the
university licensee was going forward, and patent rights/exclusive
licenses do not appear to have been necessary to facilitate
"technology transfer."' 3 2  Moreover, there is no evidence in these
cases that the other firms' development efforts were "free-riding" on
licensees' investments.'33 In fact, in at least three of these cases, the
patent had not (apparently) been licensed at all.' Contrary to the
spirit of Bayh-Dole, these patents simply allowed universities to
extract rents and perhaps even holdup development efforts.'35
126. Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
127. Id.
128. In April 2002, MIT and EFI expanded their complaint to include 214 defendants.
In the course of litigation, plaintiffs settled with some defendants and dismissed their
claims against others, so that only four remained: Corel, Microsoft, Roxio, and MGI
Software. Id. at 1344. As discussed further below, the Federal Circuit recently overturned
a district court claim construction that favored the defendants in this case. See infra note
142 and accompanying text.
129. Bd. of Regents v. Benq Am. Corp., 533 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
130. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 114, 120 (N.D.N.Y.
2004).
131. Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Lockheed Martin Global Telecomms., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 2d
1006, 1007 (D. Mass. 2003) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on
noninfringement).
132. See supra notes 116-31 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 116-31 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Benq America Corp., 533 F.3d at 1365 (listing only the University of
Texas as a plaintiff); Cornell Univ., 313 F. Supp. 2d at 118 (naming only Cornell University
and its research foundation as plaintiffs); Lockheed Martin, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1007
(naming only MIT as a plaintiff).
135. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Attempts to extract rents from firms that have commercialized
successfully may be a particular concern where the case is ultimately
very weak. Thus, it is notable that in a number of litigated cases, the
university's argument has been unequivocally rejected. 13 6  For
example, the University of Texas recently lost a case involving
patents on positron emission technology ("PET"), a medical imaging
technology that uses gamma rays to detect cancer, heart disease, brain
disorders, and other health conditions.137 The University of Texas
claimed that CTI Molecular Imaging Inc., a leading provider of PET
equipment, infringed two of its patents.'38 In that case, both the
district court and the Federal Circuit held that the defendant did not
infringe.'39 Similarly, in a recent suit brought by the University of
California and its exclusive licensee over patented software for
eliminating edge artifacts when compressing digital images, both the
district court and the Federal Circuit found that the patent in
question was neither invalid nor infringed. 4° In 2003, a lawsuit by the
University of Illinois against Fujitsu on software patents relating to
plasma display panels resulted in a summary judgment determination
that the relevant patent claims were invalid. 4' In contrast, our search
found only one case in which a university's assertions regarding its
patented software were largely vindicated by the court system, either
in a final district court decision that was not appealed or in an
appellate court decision)
4 2
Even if patenting and exclusive licensing of software do not
facilitate commercialization per se, one might argue that exclusive
licenses to university patents are useful for software start-ups, and
promoting such start-ups is a socially valuable goal. 43  But, even
assuming that the "generating start-ups" argument has merit, the
force with which it applies to software is not clear. While most small
136. In the cases discussed above, by contrast, the university patentee lost on many of
its arguments but won on some others.
137. Bd. of Regents v. CTI Molecular Imaging, Inc., 164 F. App'x 982, 982 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (per curiam) (unpublished); see CTI Molecular Imaging, Inc. Announces Dismissal
of Lawsuit, BIOSPACE, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.biospace.comlnews-story.aspxNews
EntityId=19216020.
138. See CTI Molecular Imaging, Inc., 164 F. App'x at 982.
139. See id.
140. LizardTech. Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
141. Competitive Techs. v. Fujitsu Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
142. Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
143. See, e.g., Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property
Rights, and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 451 (2004). Although
Arora and Merges do not specifically discuss university-generated research, the logic of
their argument presumably applies to such research.
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biotechnology firms that receive venture financing have patents, the
available empirical evidence indicates that most software start-ups
that receive venture financing, particularly in the first round, do not
have patents. 44 Moreover, though there is some evidence that small
software firms with patents tend to fare better than firms without such
patents,145 the evidence also indicates that the disparity is much less
significant than the disparity between biotechnology firms with and
without patents. 46  At a minimum, the "generating start-ups"
argument for patenting software is less compelling than it is for
biotechnology. In any event, in many of the cases we found, the
university was suing on its own behalf; it did not appear to have found
a licensee.1
47
Of course, litigated cases are not likely to be representative of all
university software patents. There are certainly cases of successful
commercialization where the firm in question did have an exclusive
license to a university patent. The company Google, which was the
exclusive licensee of a patent assigned to Stanford,' 4 is a prominent
example, as is RSA Security, the exclusive licensee of various data-
encryption patents assigned to MIT.'49 Moreover, as noted earlier,
university software patents do not appear to be litigated at rates
significantly different from those of university patents in other
fields.15° Thus, we cannot state unequivocally that the incidence of
holdup in the software patent context is higher than that for
university patents in other fields.
144. See Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software
Start-ups, 36 RES. POL'Y 193, 197 (2007). One limitation of the Mann and Sager data,
however, is that it includes only the patents that software firms hold in their own names.
Id. It does not include patents to which firms may have exclusive licenses. Id. Another,
perhaps more important, limitation is that the Mann and Sager study firms received
venture financing during the 1997-1999 "bubble" years, before the 2001 market crash. Id.
at 195.
145. See id. at 194-204; see also Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 49, at 33-34
(finding that in software markets where patenting is intense, entry for firms with patents is
easier than entry for firms without patents).
146. Mann & Sager, supra note 144, at 194-204.
147. See, e.g., Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 114, 118
(N.D.N.Y. 2004); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Lockheed Martin Global Telecomms., Inc., 251 F.
Supp. 2d 1006, 1007 (D. Mass. 2003).
148. Exclusive Patent License Agreement Dated July 2, 2001 Between Google and
Stanford, http://www.techagreements.com/agreement-preview.aspxnum=66564 (last
visited Apr. 21, 2009).
149. See RSA Security Inc. Company History, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/
company-historiesfRSA-Security-Inc-Company-History.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
Whether patents and exclusive licenses were particularly important to commercial success
in these cases is unclear, however.
150. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
1556 [Vol. 87
UNIVERSITY SOFTWARE OWNERSHIP
Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that holdup is more likely
in software than in other fields, mainly because patents and exclusive
licenses are less likely to be important for commercialization in this
field than in others. To put the point another way, the ratio of false
positives (patenting and giving an exclusive license when it is not
necessary for commercialization) to false negatives (failing to patent
and give an exclusive license when it is necessary for
commercialization) is likely to be higher in software than in the life
sciences. In this regard, it bears mention that some of the most
successful cases of software commercialization have not involved
patents and exclusive licenses. For example, a number of unpatented
Stanford programs have been widely adopted by the industry: both
MINOS, a linear and nonlinear optimization program, and Genscan,
a gene structure prediction program, have been used (via a copyright
license) by dozens of different commercial firms.15'
V. THE WAY FORWARD
As the Stanford example suggests, models of successful software
commercialization absent patents are possible. More generally, the
future of university software ownership may not be one in which
universities are using patents as holdup opportunities.
A. The Impact of eBay v. MercExchange and In re Bilski
As an initial matter, the holdup threat that patentees can wield
may have been mitigated by the Supreme Court's decision in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.152 In that case, the Court made it clear
that permanent injunctive relief is not automatic upon a finding of
patent infringement.'53 Rather, the plaintiff must prove each element
of the traditional four-factor test for permanent injunctive relief: (1)
that it has suffered irreparable harm; (2) that remedies available at
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
that harm; (3) that the balance of hardship between the patentee and
infringer argues in favor of a remedy in equity; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.154
Although the Supreme Court opinion explicitly addresses only
permanent injunctive relief,'55 it has been interpreted by the lower
151. See Katherine Ku, Software Licensing: Stanford's Approach, COMPUTING RES.
NEWS, Jan. 2002, at 3, 8.
152. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
153. Id. at 391-93.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 394.
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courts as raising the burden faced by plaintiffs in requests for
preliminary injunctive relief.156  The application to preliminary
injunctive relief is important because, as was indicated by the famous
$612.5 million settlement that RIM, the maker of the BlackBerry
device, paid on patents that had been seriously questioned by the
PTO illustrates,'15 7 even the threat of a preliminary injunction-before
validity and infringement have been proven-can be used to extract
large settlements.
Lower court cases interpreting eBay, particularly in the context
of permanent injunctive relief, have tended to emphasize that
irreparable harm should be presumed, and injunctive relief is thereby
available, where the patentee and the infringer are direct competitors;
in that case, infringement is likely to cause the patentee to lose
market share and profits. 58 In an instructive opinion, the eBay
district court noted on remand that irreparable harm may also be
found where a patentee is seeking to develop its patent in partnership
with others (the classic Bayh-Dole rationale).159 In contrast, where
the patentee secures revenues by approaching firms that have already
developed, so as "to maximize the value of a license," monetary
damages should be sufficient to compensate for infringement. 6 °
Thus, at least in those situations where the university patent is being
asserted without a partner licensee that practices the patent in
156. See The Fire of Genius, Injunction (Dec. 31, 2007), http://www.thefireofgenius.
com/injunctions/ (noting that, as of December 31, 2007, twelve cases had cited eBay in
denying requests for preliminary injunction).
157. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
158. For cases emphasizing direct competition when discussing irreparable harm, see
generally Smith & Nephew, Inc., v. Synthes, 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 983 (W.D. Tenn. 2006),
appeal dismissed, 269 F. App'x 972 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Tivo Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns
Corp., 664 F. Supp. 2d. 664, 669 (E.D. Tex. 2006), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded
by 516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008); z4 Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440
(E.D. Tex. 2006), affd, 507 F.3d. 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks
Inc., No. 2:03-CV-333-TJW, 2006 WL 3741891, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2006); Paice LLC
v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16,
2006), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded by 504 F.3d. 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
159. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 572 (E.D.Va. 2007),
appeal dismissed, 273 F. App'x 856 (Fed. Cir. 2008) & 273 F. App'x 857 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
In this regard, the district court's opinion was in accord with the Supreme Court's refusal
to categorically exclude universities from the possibility of injunctive relief. See eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006) ("[Slome patent holders, such as
university researchers or self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to license their
patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing necessary to bring their
works to market themselves. Such patent holders may be able to satisfy the traditional
four-factor test, and we see no basis for categorically denying them the opportunity to do
so.")
160. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
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competition with infringers, one might suppose that the university's
post-eBay bargaining leverage would be reduced.
The question of how universities should be treated for purposes
of injunctive relief was the subject of a recent Federal Circuit appeal,
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation v.
Buffalo Technology Inc.16 Although the patentee in that case,
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
("CSIRO"), is an Australian research institute, not a U.S. university,
it generates and licenses technology in precisely the same manner as
do U.S. universities. 62 Moreover, the patent in question was a
software patent that covers wireless LAN technology, specifically a
number of 802.11 standards.1 63 In CSIRO I and related cases, CSIRO
asserted its patent against not only Buffalo Technology, but also
Toshiba, SMC, 3Corn, and Microsoft."6 The district court decision
granting injunctive relief to CSIRO emphasized the eBay Court's
reluctance to categorically rule out injunctive relief for universities.
165
The court then went further, ordering injunctive relief on the theory
that a failure to grant such relief would create irreparable harm by
making it difficult for CSIRO to license its patents and thus support
its research enterprise. 16 6 Therefore, the extent to which university
patentees could continue to exercise the threat of holdup would
appear to have turned on the Federal Circuit's resolution of CSIRO I.
However, the Federal Circuit remanded the case on invalidity
grounds without ruling on the issue of injunctive relief.
1 67
161. 542 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, No. 2007-1449, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25268 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (CSIRO I).
162. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech., Inc. (CSIRO
11), 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 604 (E.D. Tex. 2007), remanded, No. 2007-1449, slip op. at 36
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions/07-1449.pdf.
163. CSIRO 1, 542 F.3d at 1367.
164. Dell, Intel, and Marvell are plaintiffs in declaratory judgment actions against
CSIRO. Microsoft Corp. v. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org., 572 F.
Supp. 2d 786, 792 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (describing the suits filed against Toshiba, SMC, 3com,
and Microsoft). Dell, Intel, and Marvell are plaintiffs in declaratory judgment actions
against CSIRO. See Microsoft Corp. v. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org.,
Nos. 6:06 CV 549, 6:06 CV 550, 2007 WL 4376104, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2007)
(describing the declaratory judgment actions brought by Dell, Intel, and Marvell against
CSIRO).
165. CSIRO II, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 603-04 (E.D. Tex. 2007), remanded, No. 2007-1449,
slip op. at 36 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/
opinions/07-1449.pdf.
166. CSIRO II, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
167. See Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech., Inc., No.
2007-1449, slip op. at 36 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.
gov/opinions/07-1449.pdf.
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As noted earlier, the Federal Circuit recently decided the much-
anticipated case of In re Bilski.168  In Bilski, the court held that
processes (including, presumably, software processes) have to effect a
physical transformation or be "tied to a machine" in order to be
patentable. 169 Because the Bilski decision explicitly leaves open the
question of whether recitation of a computer satisfies the "machine"
requirement, its impact on the enforcement of existing university
software patents is difficult to gauge fully. To the extent that Bilski
has an impact, however, that impact is likely to be limited to pure
software patents. Moreover, if the recitation of a computer is deemed
to satisfy the machine requirement, virtually all of the pure software
patents in our study should pass muster.
B. Revenue Generation Without Holdup
Contrary to the district court's theory in CSIRO II, university
interest in revenue generation can be achieved without the
innovation-chilling threat of holdup. Specifically, the alternative of
ex ante nonexclusive licensing at reasonable rates (which CSIRO
allegedly did not attempt to do despite a promise to the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers ("IEEE") to license on
"reasonable and nondiscriminatory" terms17 ) could be a mechanism
for satisfying university interests while minimizing potential harms.1 7'
Although nonexclusive licenses are something of a tax on
commercialization, a small royalty rate is unlikely to deter most
commercialization.
Sound practical reasons may, however, counsel against
nonexclusive licensing of patents. Although, as noted earlier,
economies of scale may reduce prosecution costs for large technology
transfer offices,'72 the prosecution of patents still requires some
investment of money and staff time. While exclusive licensees
typically pay patent application costs, nonexclusive licensees
168. 545 F.3d 943, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
169. Id.
170. Brief of Accton Technology Corp. (Taiwan) et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellants Buffalo Technology (USA), Inc. and Buffalo, Inc. and Reversal of Injunction
Order at 6-7, Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech., Inc., No.
2007-1449 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.mmblaw.com/media/news/
media.326.pdf (using RAND as an abbreviation for reasonable and nondiscriminatory).
171. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 151, at 8 (indicating that Stanford uses nonexclusive
licenses to make software available for "modest fees").
172. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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generally do not.'7 3 Notably, however, software (particularly pure
software) differs from virtually every other university invention in
that patents do not have to serve as the foundation of a nonexclusive
licensing scheme. Copyright, which attaches without cost upon
creation of the software, will do the job.174 For this reason, at least
some technology transfer offices state that they are beginning to
refrain from seeking patents. 75 At the University of Washington, for
example, the Digital Ventures office says that it uses patenting only if
there is a real need to improve the technology (presumably via an
exclusive license). 76 Digital Ventures has also convinced start-ups to
"go without a patent."'77 For example, MINOS, which is available via
a nonexclusive copyright license, is one of Stanford's largest money
generators.'7
Because copyright has been interpreted by the courts to cover
little more than source code,179 it generally does not, by itself, confer a
great deal of power. For this reason, commentators concerned about
the negative effects of strong proprietary rights have typically focused
on patents. Even so, firms appear to be willing to license software
because they do not want to bear the costs of independent creation.
On the other hand, even nonexclusive copyright licensing with
relatively low fees can be problematic for nonprofit researchers.
Thus, universities that want to balance the goal of academic access
with revenue generation, such as the University of Washington, are
assessing which licenses and royalty structures are appropriate for
which situations."8 ° The technology transfer offices at the University
of Washington, the University of California at Berkeley, and Stanford
University have all embraced the idea of dual licenses that give
relatively inexpensive access to the nonprofit sector but allow for
173. Statement from Joel B. Kirschbaum, Ph.D., UCSF Office of Technology
Management, Non-exclusive Patent Licenses-Who Benefits? (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
174. See Ku, supra note 151, at 8.
175. See Frequently Asked Questions, Office of Intellectual Property and Industry
Research Alliances, University of California, Berkley, http://ipira.berkeley.edu/page.php?
nav=75 (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
176. E-mail from Charles Williams, Director, Tech. Transfer, Univ. of Or., to Arti K.
Rai, Prof., Duke Univ. Sch. of Law (Sept. 2, 2005 01:19 EST) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
177. Id.
178. Telephone Interview with Katherine Ku, supra note 89.
179. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
180. See Meet Charles Williams, INGENUITY, Summer 2004, at 1, 2, available at
http://depts.washington.edu/techtran/aboutus/Newsletter/Summer04.pdf.
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revenue generation from the commercial sector.8 1 Indeed, Stanford's
lucrative MINOS business software program is available via a dual
copyright license-the commercial use costs more than ten times as
much as the academic use. 82
C. Evolving Policies at "Pro-Patent" Institutions?
Our research has also generated some evidence of evolving
policies at institutions that have historically sought large numbers of
software patents. In 2004, the University of California at Berkeley
announced a policy that appeared to give a relatively strong
endorsement to the open source model. In this new policy, the
Berkeley Technology Transfer Office states that it will work with
researchers who want to release their code under an open source
model.'83 Although it is not clear whether researchers have the final
say in cases of conflict, the new policy appears encouraging towards
open source. Berkeley has also developed, and encourages
researchers to use, an "academic" license, under which source code is
made available free of charge to academic institutions and nonprofits,
while being made available for a fee to commercial users." In
general, the new Berkeley policy appears to encourage the possibility
of releasing software under different types of licenses for different
purposes.
Moreover, although the University of Washington, Georgia
Tech, and Carnegie Mellon have a significant software patent
presence, this level of patenting may not represent a continuing
pattern. Current technology transfer officials assert that they
promote other models of software ownership. In fiscal year 2005, the
University of Washington's Digital Ventures office generated ninety
percent of its revenue from copyright licensing.'85 The Digital
Ventures web site features a large variety of unpatented software that
can be secured for commercial use through an online license with a
standard rate.8 6 Like Berkeley, the University of Washington also
encourages "forking" in its licenses-licenses in which software (and
181. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 175.
182. See Stanford Business Software Inc., Minos 5.5, http://www.sbsi-sol-optimize.com/
asp/sol product-minos.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
183. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 175 (discussing open source options
available on Berkeley's software disclosure form).
184. See id.
185. E-mail from Charles Williams, supra note 176.





underlying source code) is made available free of charge for certain
uses and available for a fee for other uses.'87 Officials at Georgia
Tech's technology licensing office note that they oversee dozens of
open source-type software licenses each year and that, given the short
technology life cycle in the software industry, algorithm patents are
often not very valuable.'88 Finally, at Carnegie Mellon, the current
technology transfer team states that it almost never patents unless
another entity is willing to pay for such patenting. 1 9
Furthermore, information technology can substantially facilitate
the task of low-transaction cost, nonexclusive licensing. Universities
such as Stanford already make software like MINOS available
through simple web-based interfaces. 90 Several dozen universities
are currently participating in the Kauffman Foundation's web-based
I-Bridge project, which aims to reduce the transaction costs
associated with licensing: many of the projects available on the I-
Bridge site represent software.' Additionally, some large
technology firms have decided to sponsor software projects at
universities under an explicit "open collaboration" model.'92 In 2005,
four technology firms (IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Intel, and Cisco)
announced a set of "Open Collaborative Research" principles under
which certain types of sponsored research in software would be made
freely available.' 93 IBM is now embarking on specific software
projects at seven universities under the rubric of these principles. 94
D. The Role of Open Source
The related question of using copyright to promote open source
within the university is an interesting one. As we have noted, some
universities have long embraced open source, and these universities
tend to have smaller numbers of pure software patents. 9 5 But even
among technology transfer officials sympathetic to the goals of open
source, some mention difficulties that open source may create in the
187. Id.
188. Telephone Interview with Kevin Wozniak, Interim Dir. of Tech. Licensing, Ga.
Tech. Research Corp. (Sept. 1, 2005).
189. Telephone Interview with Carl P. Mahler II, supra note 98.
190. See Minos 5.5, supra note 182.
191. Ibridge, http://www.ibridgenetwork.org/ (search "Search Innovations" for
"software") (last visited Apr. 21, 2009) (listing participating organizations).
192. See Lohr, supra note 17.
193. Id.
194. Id. These universities are Berkeley, Carnegie Mellon, Georgia Tech, the
University of Illinois, Rensselaer, Stanford, and the University of Texas, Austin.
195. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
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university setting.196 For example, faculty may prefer open source as a
method of distribution, not because of ideological commitment, but
because open source-related consulting revenues, unlike licensing
royalties, do not have to be shared with the university. 19 7 Indeed, at
least one prominent technology transfer officer (who preferred to
remain anonymous) believes that some faculty make software open
source for the purpose of attracting widespread interest, but have
every intention of asserting proprietary rights over the source code at
some later point. 9 ' Additionally, software is often developed by
groups, and technology transfer officers sometimes find themselves in
the middle of disputes among group members about the best open
source mechanism to use (or, indeed, whether open source should be
used at all). 9 9  Technology transfer officers are also wary that
particular types of open source licenses will conflict with obligations
to sponsors, including the federal government under Bayh-Dole. 0
Thus, to the extent funding agencies are interested in an open source
approach because they think such an approach is likely to produce
better software, they need to be aware of possible institutional
impediments.
One final point bears emphasis. Because our quantitative data
concludes with patents filed in the late 1990s, we cannot say that
university software holdings have continued to grow. Indeed, as
noted, technology transfer officers from universities with significant
software patent holdings, such as the University of Washington and
Carnegie Mellon, state that they are now quite receptive to
196. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
197. E-mail from Patrick Jones, Director, Office of Tech. Transfer, Univ. of Ariz., to
Arti K. Rai, Prof., Duke Univ. Sch. of Law (Apr. 3, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
198. This technology transfer officer did not specify precisely how a faculty member
would assert proprietary rights. In the context of a viral license, one mechanism for doing
so would be to "fork" the license. One prong of the license would remain viral while the
other, made available to paying customers, would not be viral in character. The software
producer MySQL has adopted this strategy. See MySQL, Commercial License for OEMS,
ISVs, and VARs (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.mysql.com/about/legal/licensing/oem/.
199. Telephone Interview with Lita L. Nelsen, supra note 90; Telephone Interviews
with Charles Williams, supra note 96.
200. In theory, under Bayh-Dole, if the university and researcher choose not to patent,
the government has the option of patenting. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517,
94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-11 (2006)). Whether a decision to
release software under an open source license represents an unwarranted interference
with the government's option remains an open question, at least in theory. In practice,
however, we are unaware of any situation where a decision to release software under an
open source license has interfered with an agency's desire to patent.
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nonpatent-based modes of technology transfer.0 Whether university
patenting and licensing practices are currently different from
practices in the late 1990s would be a valuable subject for further
research. Even if filing practices have changed, however, the existing
stock of software patents may represent a lucrative source of
revenues when asserted against firms that have commercialized
successfully. The extent to which such holdup strategies are
successful may depend on how the CSIRO line of cases are resolved.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have undertaken the first systematic
investigation of university software ownership and litigation. We
found that software patents represent a significant, and growing,
percentage of university patent holdings. Moreover, our qualitative
results and research from a complementary econometric analysis,
suggest that universities have followed a "one size fits all" approach:
those with higher patent propensities in other fields also tend to
patent more software. From a policy standpoint, this finding suggests
a problem. Software-and particularly pure software-is likely to
follow a different commercialization path than invention in other
fields. Therefore, patenting and exclusive licensing of software may
yield a higher proportion of situations where the exclusive licensee
uses a patent to hold up an entity that has successfully
commercialized without the need for an exclusive license. Moreover,
even if the goal is not promoting commercialization per se, but
promoting start-ups, exclusive patent licenses are not necessarily
critical to that goal.
To be sure, university practices with respect to software are not
uniform. For example, universities that have policies friendly to open
source are less likely to patent pure software. More generally, a fair
number of universities-including universities with large numbers of
software patents-may now be moving away from patenting and
exclusive licensing of software.2 2 However, the lingering impact of a
substantial university patent portfolio, some of which has been
licensed exclusively, may continue to be felt in socially unproductive
litigation.
201. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
202. To investigate this proposition further, we are currently doing work investigating
more recent patent applications that have resulted in issued patents.
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APPENDIX
Questions for Technology Transfer Officers
1) Is there an official university policy regarding ownership and
dissemination of software and software-based inventions? If
yes, what is it?
2) Are there more informal guidelines or norms that govern
ownership and dissemination of software or software-based
inventions? If yes, what are they?
3) How does the technology transfer office decide whether it
should seek a patent on software or software-based
inventions?
4) What is the university's policy, if any, towards open source
software?
5) Are there any trends or changes in university policy towards
ownership of software or software-based inventions that are
worthy of note?
6) Have you had any conflicts with faculty members regarding
how software or software-based inventions should be owned
or disseminated? In cases of conflict, who makes the
determination?
Questions for Academics/Graduate Students
1) Are you aware of an official university policy regarding
ownership and dissemination of software and software-based
inventions? If yes, what is it?
2) Are you aware of informal guidelines or norms that govern
ownership and dissemination of software or software-based
inventions? If yes, what are they?
3) Do you know how the technology transfer office decides
whether it should seek a patent on software or software-
based inventions?
4) Are you aware of any university policy towards open source
software? If yes, what is it?
5) Are there any trends or changes in university policy towards
ownership of software that are worthy of note?
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6) Have you had any conflicts with the technology transfer
office regarding how software or software-based inventions
should be owned or disseminated? In cases of conflict, who
makes the determination?
7) Do you produce or use open source software?
8) Do you generally disclose software or software-based
inventions to the technology transfer office?
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Table Al: Comparison of Bessen-Hunt Keyword-Based Classification
of Software Patents with Our Classification
Our Classification
Bessen-Hunt
Classification Non SW SW Total
2,325 202 2,527
Non SW 92.01 7.99 100
91.32 51.01 85.89
221 194 415
SW 53.25 46.75 100
8.68 48.99 14.11
2,546 396 2,942
Total 86.54 13.46 100
100 100 100
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Table A2: Comparison of Graham-Mowery IPC-Based Classification




Classification Non SW SW Total
2,544 341 2,885
Non SW 88.18 11.82 100
99.92 86.11 98.06
2 55 57
SW 3.51 96.49 100
0.08 13.89 1.94
2,546 396 2,942
Total 86.54 13.46 100
100 100 100
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Table A3: Comparison of Graham-Mowery USPC-Based
Classification of Software Patents with Our Classification
Graham-
,,, co Non SW SW Total
2,541 328 2,869
Non SW 88.57 11.43 100
99.80 82.83 97.52
5 68 73
SW 6.85 93.15 100
0.20 17.17 2.48
2,546 396 2,942
Total 86.54 13.46 100
100 100 100
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